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Abstract
On May 12, 1980, the Financial Accounting Standards Board released
Statement Number 36 that mandated publication, in a footnote to the
annual report, information on pension plan assets and liabilities
including the interest rate assumed in arriving at the cost estimates.
An event-time study of the effect of interest rate disclosure demon-
strates that securities of firms using a low interest rate assumption
outperformed the securities of firms using a high interest rate assump-
tion during the period surrounding the release of FASB No. 36.
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Three developments within the last decade have combined to focus
attention on a previously neglected aspect of corporate finance, the
corporate pension plan. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) legislated stringent standards for corporate pension
plans including minimum funding requirements. The Financial Accounting
Standards 3oard Statement Number 35 (FASB No. 35) [4] provided uniform
standards for pension plan financial reporting. The Financial
Accounting Standards Board Statement Number 36 (FASB No. 36) [5] man-
dated the disclosure by employers in a footnote to financial statements
of information on the assets and liabilities of pension plans. As
ERISA funding requirements generated rapid growth in the assets of pen-
sion plans, and FASB No. 35 and FASB No. 36 required disclosure of
assets and liabilities, corporate officers are looking to the assets to
finance operations, financial analysts are considering relative values
in stock selections, and researchers are including pension values in
financial models.
This paper reports on an event-time study of the effects of FASB
No. 35 and FASB No. 36 on two samples of firms. Both samples con-
sistent of companies that have large pension liabilities in relation
to net worth. One group of firms uses low interest rate assumptions
in projecting pension plan costs; the other group uses high interest
rate assumptions. The objective of this research is to determine if
the release of FASB No. 36 had a differential effect on the share
prices of firms depending on the interest rate assumption used in the
firm's corporate pension plan.
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The paper is organized in the following manner. Section I reviews
the history of pension accounting and the literature on pension finance.
Section II describes the sources of data and the rationale and proce-
dure for the sample selection. Section III describes the research
methodology and test statistics. Section IV explains the results, and
Section V interprets the findings and provides conclusions.
I - Pension Accounting and Pension Finance
The Financial Accounting Standards Board has wrestled with the
issue of pension accounting and disclosure for two decades, as shown in
Table 1. In 1965, Accounting Principles Board No. 8, "Accounting for
the Cost of Pension Plans" was promulgated. This statement formally
recognized pension issues in firm valuation, but left to the discretion
of the firm the determination of a proper methodology for valuing the
pension plan and disclosure of pension values. Shortly after Congress
passed ERISA, FASB began to work on disclosure requirements issuing a
Decision Memorandum in 1975, holding public hearings in 1976, and
issuing an Exposure Draft in 1977 with a tentative effective date of
December 15, 1977. However, controversy led to the indefinite post-
ponement of the 1977 statement and further work on the proposal. A
revised Exposure Draft was issued in 1979 and final promulgation of
pension accounting regulations occurred in 1980 with FASB No. 35 issued
on March 19, 1980, and FASB No. 36 issued on May 12, 1980. FASB No. 35
addressed financial reporting by the plans themselves; FASB No. 36
addressed disclosure of pension information to investors crediting and
employees.
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Insert Table 1 Here
FASB No. 35 required that pension plans disclose to participants
such information as net assets available to pay benefits and the
actuarial present value of accumulated plan benefits. Assets are to
be shown at fair value. Benefits are discounted for interest and the
probability of payment, considering the likelihood of death, disabil-
ity, withdrawal, and retirement.
FASB No. 36 required that firms release information on the actual
present value of vested and nonvested accumulated plan benefits, the
net assets available for benefits, the assumed rate of return in
determining the actuarial present values, and the date as of which the
benefit information was determined. This information was required to
be disclosed with each set of complete financial statements issued for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1979, and for complete sets
of financial statements for interim periods issued after June 30, 1980.
For example, any annual reports published for fiscal years ending after
December 16, 1980, would indicate pension disclosure.
Pension liabilities, although disclosed in financial statements,
are not known values. The true cost of pension liabilities in defined
benefit plans cannot be calculated until the last of the current par-
ticipants ceases to receive a benefit, which is generally more than 60
years in the future. Pension liabilities included in the financial
statements are estimated values based on a wide range of assumptions
including mortality, employee turnover, disability rates, salary rates,
retirement rates, and investment performance. FASB No. 36 singled out
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two assumptions for specific consideration. Future salary increases
are not included in determining pension liabilities for financial dis-
closure even if the pension plan bases benefits on an employee's final
salary level. Thus, the liability for a pension, for example, for a
45-year-old employee currently earning $20,000 per year who is expected
to receive a benefit of 40 percent of final salary (based of past and
future benefit accruals) would be $8,000 per year beginning at the
expected retirement date, despite the fact that inflation and merit
increases are all but certain to increase the employee's salary level
prior to retirement, thus increasing the pension.
FAS3 No. 36 also required firms to disclose the interest rate, or
range of interest rates, applied to current assets and future contribu-
tions. Pension costs are extremely sensitive to interest rate assump-
tions, with each one fourth of a percentage point change in interest
rates affecting pension costs by between 4 and 7 percent [15, p. 198].
Currently the FASB is considering more stringent disclosure
requirements, including consideration of future salary increases and
incorporating the pension liabilities on the balance sheet instead of
in a footnote disclosure. Such proposals are meeting extensive
opposition [10]
.
Many of the objections to pension fund disclosure are based on con-
cern that the value of the firm will be adversely affected by such dis-
closure. These fears are not supported by finance literature. In
fact, the literature on this topic indicates that pension policy of a
firm either does not affect firm value or is already incorporated in
share prices. Sharpe [13] determines that the investment policy of a
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pension plan does not affect firm value. Feldstein and Seligman [3]
conclude that unfunded pension liabilities are already fully reflected
in share prices. Ifflander and Martin [8] find that no significant
difference in market performance exists for underfunded and overfunded
pension plans around the release date of funding information.
Finance theory also indicates funding and investment strategies for
pension plans. Black [1] and Tepper [14], considering the tax advan-
tages of pension investments, both show that pension plans should be
fully funded and invested in bonds. Harrison and Sharpe [7], consider-
ing the limited liability of pension assets, show that investments in
either all bonds or all common stocks, are optimal depending on funding
level. Langetieg [9] analyses the optimal funding and investment poli-
cies under varying funding levels, ratios for firms' sharing in workers'
uninsured pension losses, ratios for firms' sharing pension gains with
workers, tax rates, risk free rates, and ratios of firms' net worth to
pension liabilities. In almost all cases, the optimal funding policy
is to invest in either all bonds or all common stocks. Since these
investment policies are not followed in practice, a gap between theory
and practice exists.
Despite the theoretical and empirical literature on pension funding
policy that demonstrates that no significant market effect exists, the
value of pension fund disclosure is not settled. Prior literature
treats pension liabilities as known or knowable values when in fact
they are simply estimates. As such, the funding policy and adequacy
of funding depend significantly on the accuracy of these estimates.
FASB No. 36 provides for the disclosure of one element of the pension
-6-
liability estimate, the interest rate. In most pension plans this
value is the most important determinant in calculating pension costs
and liabilities. If unfunded pension liabilities are reflected in
share prices as proposed by Feldstein and Seligman, then the proper
discount should be a normalized, or market expectation, set of actu-
arial assumptions inherent in pension costing, and not simply the set
chosen by the firm's management and actuaries. However prior to FASB
No. 36, the public did not have access to pension plan assumptions. As
of the day FASB No. 36 was released, all investors or potential inves-
tors who knew the firm's assumed interest rate in the pension valuation
realized that this information would eventually be made public.
This paper examines differentials in interest rate assumptions by
firms in determining pension liabilities. Firms with lower interest
rates are more conservative in their forecast and, assuming similar
investment policies, are more likely to achieve the assumed rate of
return than firms with higher interest rate assumptions. Thus, if pen-
sion policy is reflected in market value, then investors either will
already have rewarded, or will reward on discovery, firms with lower
interest rate assumptions.
The hypothesis tested in this study is that the stock prices of firms
with low interest rate assumptions will react more favorably to FASB No.
36 than will the prices of firms with high interest rate assumptions.
The null hypothesis is that FASB No. 36 has no effect on either group.
If capital markets are efficient, then no significant differences will
occur subsequent to the release of FASB No. 36, although anticipation
of, and the release itself, could affect the two groups differently.
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II - Sample Selection
This paper provides an event-time study for interest rate disclo-
sure in pension plans. The two dates of interest are the days FASB
No. 35 (March 19, 1980) and FASB No. 36 (May 12, 1980) were issued.
FASB No. 35 established uniform accounting standards for pension
plans. FASB No. 36 required future disclosure of interest rate
assumptions. The pension information disclosed is compiled in the
FASB Statement 36 Data Bank maintained by The Accounting Research
Center, Columbia University. This data bank includes pension plan
interest rate assumptions for 1113 firms for the year 1980; assumed
rates range in value from 2.0 to 13.0 percent.
Two criteria were established to obtain two groups of firms for a
comparison of the effect of interest rate assumptions on market
performance. First, a large differential in assumed interest rates had
to exist between the two groups. Second, pension exposure had to be a
significant factor in a firm's financial position. To assure a large
interest rate differential, all firms were rank ordered by the assumed
interest rate, and cutoff levels established that divided the firms
into three approximately equal sized groups. The low interest rate
group had an interesc rate assumption of less than or equal to 6.1
percent; the high interest rate group had an interest rate assumption
of over 8.0 percent. The middle third was excluded. To meet the
second criterion, only firms in which accumulated vested benefit plus
accumulated nonvested benefits exceeded 30 percent of the firm's net
worth were included in the final samples. After requiring complete
information on the FASB tape, Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT Industrial
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Tape, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRS?) daily
return file, and the above criteria, the low interest rate group con-
tained 54 firms and the high interest rate group contained 79 firms.
Firm characteristics are shown in Table 2. Daily returns from CRSP
for each sample firm were collected for a 156 trading-days period,
broken down into three subperiods as shown in Table 3.
Insert Tables 2 & 3 Here
It should be noted that parameter estimates are based only on 100
trading days in the pre-event period. The 45 days immediately pre-
ceding the event are excluded from the parameter estimation period.
This is a common procedure when it is believed that the market antici-
pates the event. Using the returns during this time period may intro-
duce noise into the model. We use only 10 days for the post-event
analysis. Since stock prices react continuously to new information,
it will be extremely difficult to attribute price changes over a long
period of time after the event day to a specific source of infor-
mation, such as FAS3 No. 36.
Ill - Methodology
The event-time methodology used to examine security returns during
the event period is described at length in the appendix to Dodd and
Warner [2] and will be described only briefly here. For each security
j the market model is used to calculate an excess return, or prediction
error (?E), for event day t within the analysis period as follows:
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(1) PE. = R. - (a.+g.R )
Jt Jt 3 j mt
where
R. = the rate of return on security j for event day t, and
R = the rate of return on the CRSP value-weighted index on event
mt
day t.
The coefficients a. and $. are the ordinary least squares estimates of
the intercept and slope respectively, of the market model regression.
The estimation period is from t = -145 to t = -46 relative to the
event day t = 0. For any event day t, the mean prediction error (PE )
across sample firms is:
(2) K
t
-i ZPE
3=1
where N = the number of firms.
These mean prediction errors are cumulated over event time to obtain
cumulative daily mean prediction error (CPE):
L
(3) CPE = Z PE
t=K
l
where K and L specify the time period relative to t = 0.
If the market is efficient, PE and CPE should not be statistically
' t
different from zero except upon anticipation or receipt of new infor-
mation. To determine whether the mean prediction error on a portfolio
of N securities is significantly different from zero surrounding the
announcements, we use the test statistic, the mean standardized cumula-
tive prediction error (SPE), described by Dodd and Warner [2J. To
compute this statistic, the mean prediction error PE is standardized
by its estimated standard deviation s
,
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(4) SPE - PE /s .
t t t
Assuming that the market model residuals are independent and iden-
tically distributed, this test statistic is student's t-distributed
with 98 degrees of freedom. To test whether the average daily predic-
tion error in the immediate pre-announcement period is significantly
different from zero, the following test statistic, Z, is used:
L
Z SPE
t-K t
(5) 7 =
/k
where M = L - K + 1, the number of days in the period. This statistic
has a student's t-distribution with L-K degrees of freedom, assuming
that the average prediction errors are independent and identically
distributed.
IV - Empirical Results
The daily mean prediction errors (PEs) and cumulative mean predic-
tion errors (CPEs) for the low interest rate group and the high interest
rate group are reported in Table 4 for day t = -45 through day t = 10.
Figure 1 also plots the cumulative daily mean prediction errors for
both groups. On March 18, 1980 (day t = -38), both groups experienced
significant negative daily mean prediction errors and both CPEs fell
below zero. This result occurred the day before FASB Mo. 35 was pro-
mulgated. Since, by construction, both groups represented firms with
high pension exposure (accumulated vested and nonvested benefits
exceeded 30 percent of the firm's net worth), any information that
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adversely affected pension plans would be expected to influence the
market price of these firms inordinately. A similar result occurred
on April 21, 1980 (t = -15), when an article in Barrons discussed the
effect of applying ERISA to multiemployer pension funds [11] . The
pending expansion of ERISA was projected to require $4.5 billion in
unfunded liabilities from terminated multiemployer plans to be covered
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in over a ten year
period. As the PBGC is funded by a tax on employers with pension plans
(currently based on a per employee basis), adverse experience would be
expected to affect firms with large pension liabilities negatively. On
this day, both groups experienced significant negative daily mean pre-
diction errors.
On day t = (May 12, 1980), the day on which FASB No. 36 was pro-
mulgated, both groups exhibited negative daily mean prediction errors
which are statistically insignificant. But on day t -2 the low
interest rate group exhibited a positive mean prediction error which is
significant at 10 percent level. This might be due to the market's
anticipation of the release of FASB No. 36. On day t = 2 the low
interest rate group again exhibited a positive mean prediction error
which is significant at the 10 percent level. This is the only measur-
able reaction following release of FAS3 No. 36.
Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 Here
To further test whether the mean prediction errors in the immediate
pre- and post-announcement periods are significantly different from
zero, the periods from t = -42 through t = -38, t -36 through t -32,
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t = -5 through t = -1, and t = 1 through t = 5 are chosen. These
periods represent the five trading days prior to and after each FASB
release, but the selection of five day periods is admittedly arbitrary.
Table 5 reports Z-statistics for the mean prediction errors over these
four time periods. The mean prediction errors of both groups are not
significantly different from zero for the period from t = -42 through t
= -38 (the pre-announcement period of FASB No. 35), even though on day
t = -38 both groups experienced significant negative mean prediction
errors. Neither are the mean prediction errors of both groups in the
immediate post-announcement period of FAS3 No. 35 significantly differ-
ent from zero. The market seemed to anticipate the release of FASB No.
35 one day ahead and fully digest the news in a very efficient manner.
However, for the period from t = -5 through t = -1 (the pre-announcement
period of FASB No. 36), the mean prediction error for the low interest
rate group is positive and significantly different from zero at the 5%
level (two-tailed test). On average, and adjusted for the overall
market change, the price of the low interest rate group stocks rose by
about 2.4% during the five trading days prior to the release of FASB
No. 36. However, the mean prediction error for the high interest rate
group is not significantly different from zero. This may be due to the
fact that with the release of FASB No. 36 which mandated future disclo-
sure of the assumed interest rate, firms with lower interest rates are
believed to be more likely to achieve the assumed rate of return than
firms with high interest rate assumptions. For the post-announcement
period of FASB No. 36, both groups exhibited positive mean prediction
errors which are not significantly different from zero.
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Insert Table 5 Here
3ased on the above analysis, the null hypothesis that FASB No. 36
would have no effect on either group is rejected. As expected, the
low interest rate group experienced a more favorable reaction to this
release than the high interest rate group. Significant positive mean
prediction errors on days t = -2 and t = 2 (at the 10 percent level)
and for the five days t = -5 through t = -1 (at the 5 percent level)
for the low interest rate group, in contrast with no significant pre-
diction errors for the high interest rate group in the period surround-
ing the release of FASB No. 36, demonstrate that this disclosure stan-
dard more favorably affected firms with low interest rate assumptions.
The period of this analysis represented turbulent times for the
financial markets. On March 27, 1980 (day t = -31), collapse of the
silver market caused the stock market to react strongly. The Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) x^as down 25 points during the day but recov-
ered late to close down only 2.14 points. On April 8, 1980 (day t =
-23), the United States broke diplomatic relations with and imposed
economic sanctions on Iran. On April 22, 1980 (t = -14), the DJIA
surged 30.92 points as Treasury bill yields declined sharply. No major
economic news was announced around the release date of FASB No. 36.
The methodology used in this study calculates a prediction error
after the market factor is removed (Equation 1). Thus, the mean pre-
diction errors shown on Table 4 represent excess returns after adjust-
ing for the relative volatility of the securities (B.) and the total
market movement. On day t = -31, both groups experienced significant
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negative prediction errors, with significant positive prediction errors
the following day. The same pattern occurred on days t = -14 and -13
for the low interest rate group. For these periods of strong market
movements, prices of securities in the sample appear to lag the CRSP
4
value-weighted index slightly. As the prediction error for the low
interest rate group was significantly positive on day t = -2 and for
the five day period t = -5 through -1 (Table 5), after the market move-
ment has been removed, the price movement of the low interest rate
group can be attributed to the pending release of FAS3 No. 36.
It should be borne in mind that the actual market impact of the
FASB No. 36 was possibly more pronounced than that revealed by the
aforementioned analyses, due to anticipation of FASB No. 36 ? s content
by the market. Specifically, if FASB No. 36' s content were anticipated
before its release, some of the market impact would have been reflected
in stock returns several days or even weeks prior to its release. In
other words, had FASB Mo. 36 been anticipated, one would have expected
to observe differences in the CPEs' behavior of the low and high inter-
est rate groups during the early announcement period, given the differ-
ences in the implications of the FASB No. 36 for the two groups. Since
the Financial Accounting Standards Board works publicly, soliciting
input and reaction to proposals from parties affected by its rulings,
advance knowledge of standards is not surprising. Examination of
Figure 1 shows that the CPEs of the low and high interest rate groups
moved very closely before t = -27. Since then, the CPE of the high
interest rate group was consistently below that of the low interest
rate group, and the gap widened when approaching the release of FASB
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No. 36. Over the 28 trading days between t = -27 and t = 0, the CPE
for the firms with low interest rate assumptions increased from
-0.01867 to -0.00329, a gain of 0.01538. In comparison, the CPE for
the firms with high interest rate assumptions went from -0.01687 to
-0.03092, a loss of 0.01405. Therefore, it appears that FASB No. 36
was anticipated by the market long before it was released, providing
strong evidence on capital market efficiency.
V - Conclusion
The objective of this study is to analyze market performance of the
securities of firms with differential interest rate assumptions for
corporate pension plans around the release date of FASB No. 36, which
mandated future disclosure of assumed interest rates. Approximately
two months prior to the release of FASB No. 36, FASB No. 35 was promul-
gated defining guidelines for pension plan reporting. FASB No. 35 had
a definite negative effect on all firms with large pension liabilities.
However, subsequent to the effect of FASB No. 35, the risk adjusted
market performance of firms with low interest rate assumptions for cor-
porate pension plans was superior to that of firms with high interest
rate assumptions during the time period surrounding the release of FASB
No. 36. These results indicate that pension plan considerations do
affect market performance and increased disclosure provides investors
with valuable additional information. However, the time frame for this
study shows that adjustments in market price occur prior to the time
the information was publicly available.
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The results of this study provide support for the trend to require
additional disclosure of pension plan assumptions. Pension liabilities
are not known values but simply estimates of future costs. The accuracy
of the estimates vary based on the assumptions made in arriving at the
forecasted cost.
This study shows that simply mandating future disclosure of the
pension plan interest rate assumptions affects market performance, with
firms using low interest rate assumptions outperforming firms with high
interest rate assumptions. The fact that the market reacted in this
differential manner prior to the release of FASB No. 36 indicates that
interest rate assumptions for pension plans are an important financial
value. Investors must be assured of access to the assumptions inherent
in pension plan costing for market forces to work effectively.
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Footnotes
An employee has a nonforfeitable right to vested benefits. Non-
vested benefits require continued employment or company action, such
as the termination of the pension plan, in order to be assured. In
calculating the nonvested benefits, actuaries assume certain levels of
terminations so the published values for nonvested benefits represent
likely future corporate responsibilities, except for the fact that
salary increases are ignored.
As Scholes and Williams [12] bave shown, nonsynchronous trading of
securities may introduce into the market model a potential econometric
problem of errors in variables. Therefore, a diagnostic check of the
market model residuals for each security in the sample is required.
Inspection of the Durbin-Watson statistics indicates residual autocor-
relation is not a problem in this study. For the low interest rate
group only 3 securities (of 54) have Durbin-Watson statistics signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level, whereas for the high interest rate group,
only 6 securities (of 79) have Durbin-Watson statistics significant at
the 1 percent level.
The value of S is given by
s
t
„ [s2(i+^+ D
mt » ) 3
1/2
L (R -R )
2
, mt m
T=l
2
where S = residual variance for portfolio of N securities from the
market model regression,
D = number of observations during the estimation period,
R = rate of return on the market index for day t of the event
mt . jperiod,
R = mean rate of return on the market index during the esti-
m
mation period, and
r = rate of return on the market index for day t of the
mt .. _, . ,
estimation period.
4
A possible explanation for this slight lag is the lower frequency
of trading for the stocks of firms in the samples compared with the
large firms that dominate market averages. If a large price change is
experienced in the final hour of trading, then the time of the last
trade is important. The CRSP file includes closing prices that repre-
sent the last trade. The large capitalization firms' stocks will
likely have traded close to the bell, but a smaller firm may not have
traded for an hour or more. Tnus , the closing price for the smaller
firms is not as current as for the larger firms. This would introduce
the slight lag observable on the days of volatile markets.
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Table 1
PENSION ACCOUNTING CHRONOLOGY
DATE
05/xx/65
12/31/66
xx/xx/74
ll/xx/74
02/xx/75
10/06/75
02/04/76
- 02/05/76
04/14/77
09/30/77
12/15/77
07/09/79
09/21/79
12/15/79
03/19/80
05/12/80
06/30/80
02/xx/8I
EVENT
APB—Accounting Research Study No. 8:
the Cost of Pension Plans"
"Accounting for
Effective date of APB No. 8
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974)
FASB put a project on accounting and reporting for
employee benefit plans on its technical agenda
10-member task force to counsel FASB in preparation of
Discussion Memorandum analyzing issues related
Discussion Memorandum issued
Public hearings are held on issue
FASB issued exposure draft: "Accounting and Reporting
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans"
FASB announced it would be unable to issue final state-
ment in 1977
Effective date of draft of 04/14/77 if issued
Revised exposure draft issued
Due date for written comments on revised exposure draft
FASB 35 & 36 effective for plan years beginning after
this date
FASB 35 issued
FASB 36 issued
Complete interim statements after this date require
disclosure (if fiscal year after 12/15/79)
FASB issued "Discussion Memorandum on Employers'
Accounting for Pensions and Other Postemployment
Benefits"
02/06/81 FASB Technical Bulletin No. 81-3
Table 1 (continued)
07/xx/81 Public hearings on subject
ll/xx/82 FASB issued "Preliminary Views on Employers'
Accounting for Pensions and other Postemployment
Benefits"
04/19/83 FASB issued "Second Discussion Memorandum on
Employers ' Accounting for Pensions and other
Postemployment Benefits"
01/13/84- Public hearings on subject
01/19/84
Table 2
Characteristics of Sample Firms
Assumed Interest Pension Benefit/
Rate Net Worth
# of Firms Min Max Min Max
Low interest rate group 54 2.0 6.1 0.317 12.058
High interest rate group 79 8.0 13.0 0.302 5.310
Table 3
Calendar Dates for Three Subperiods
No. of
Trading
Subperiod Dates Days
1. The "Pre-Announcement" October 15, 1979- 100
period used for estimating March 6, 1980
the "Market Model" parameters
for each firm.
2. The "Announcement" period March 7, 1980- 46
May 12, 1980
3. The "Post-Announcement" May 13, 1980- 10
period May 27, 1980
Total 156
Table 4
Daily mean market-adjusted prediction errors (?E) and
cumulative sum of the daily mean prediction error (CPE)
from 45 days before through 10 days after the event day.
Low Interest Rat e Group High Interest Rate Group
Day pe~ CPE ~pe" CPE
-45 .00331 .00331 .00335 .00335
-44
-.00658+ -.00327 -.00384 -.00048
-43 -.00258*
-.00586 .00015 -.00033
-42
.00263 -.00322 .00049 .00016
-41
.00395 .00073 .00567 .00582
-40 .00214 .00286 .00308 .00890
-39
-.00124 .00163 -.00021 .00870
-38 -.01504** -.01342 -.01317** -.00447
-37
.00462 -.00880 -.00075 -.00521
-36 .00315 -.00565 .00328 -.00194
-35 -.00284 -.00850 .00107 -.00086
-34
.00035 -.00815 -.00630 -.00716
-33
-.00193 -.01008 -.00362 -.01078
-32 .00081 -.00927 .00360 -.00718
-31 -.02722**
-.03649 -.02284** -.03002
-30 .00910* -.02738 .00825+ -.02176
-29 .00408 -.02330 .00439 -.01737
-2b .00463 -.01867 .00050 -.01687
-27
.00370 -.01497 -.00094 -.01781
-26
.00391 -.01106 -.00076 -.01857
-25 .00229 -.00877 .00059 -.01798
-24
-.0048b -.01364 -.00696+ -.02494
-23
-.0083'J* -.02203 -.00968* -.03462
-22 .00378 -.01825 .00646 -.02815
-21
.00378 -.01447 .00722+ -.02093
-20
-.00122 -.01569 -.00238 -.02331
-19
-.00169 -.01738 -.00481 -.02812
-18 .00218 -.01519 -.00073 -.02885
-17
.00035 -.01484 -.00549 -.03434
-16
.00355 -.01129 -.00016 -.03450
-15
-.00b74+ -.01802 -.00679+ -.04129
-14
-.01039* -.02842 -.00206 -.04334
-13 .00742* -.02099 .00119 -.04215
-12
-.00146 -.02245 .00243 -.03972
-11 -.00518 -.02763 -.00273 -.04245
-10
.00106 -.02657 .00230 -.04015
- 9 -.00163 -.02820 .00422 -.03593
- 8 -.00259 -.03079 .00144 -.03449
- 7 .00184 -.02894 .00165 -.03283
- 6 .00268 -.02626 .00018 -.03266
- 5 .00555 -.02072 -.00135 -.03400
— 4 .00307 -.01765
-.00128 -.03528
Table 4 (cont.)
Low Interest Rat e Group High Interest Rate Group
Day pe" CPE pe" CPE
- 3 .00336 -.01429 .00116 -.03412
- 2 .00700+ -.00729 .00193 -.03219
- 1 .00508 -.00221 .00322 -.02897
-.00108 -.00329 -.00195 -.03092
1 .00169 -.00160 .00199 -.02893
2 .00634+ .00474 .00123 -.02770
3 -.00230 .00244 .00585 -.02185
4 .00117 .00361 .00335 -.01850
5 -.00012 .00349 .00036 -.01815
6 .00246 .00595 .00577 -.01238
7 .00045 .00641 -.00504 -.01743
8 .00232 .00872 .00438 -.01304
9 .00105 .00978 .00135 -.01169
10 -.00194 .00784 -.00142 -.01311
-A-JL __
* =
+ =
Significant at 1% level.
Significant at 5% level.
Significant at 10% level
Table 5
The mean prediction errors in the immediate
pre and post-announcement periods
Pre-announcement Period
t = -42 through t = -38
t = -5 through t = -1
Low Interest
Rate Group
-0.0076
(-0-871)3
0.0240
(2.853)*
High Interest
Rate Group
-0.0041
(-0.439)
0.0037
(0.399)
Post-announcement Period
t = -36 through t = -32
t = 1 through t = 5
-0.0005
(-0.059)
0.0068
(0.804)
-0.0020
(-0.178)
0.0128
(1.401)
a = The Z statistics of equation (5) are in parentheses.
* = Significant at 5% level (two-tailed test).



